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Abstract

The market for voluntary carbon osets has grown steadily in the last
decade, yet it remains a very small niche. Most emissions from business
travel are still not oset. This paper exploits a unique dataset examining
the decision to purchase carbon osets at two academic conferences in environmental and ecological economics. We nd that having the conference
expenses covered by one's institution increases the likelihood of osetting,
but practical and ethical reservations as well as personal characteristics
and preferences also play an important role. We draw lessons from the
eect of objections on the use of osets and discuss the implications for
practitioners and policy-makers. Based on our ndings, we conclude that
ecological and environmental economists should be more involved in the
design and use of carbon osets.
Keywords: Voluntary carbon osetting; Public goods; Ecolog-

ical economics; Environmental economics
JEL codes: D6, H8, Q4
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Introduction

While international negotiators have struggled to nd an eective agreement
limiting global greenhouse gas emissions for two decades, an important contribution to climate change mitigation has come from unilateral initiatives from
countries, regions, cities and private citizens.

Such trend supports Ostrom's

vision of the rise of a polycentric governance, and more in general the nonnegligible scope for cooperation in the climate commons (Ostrom 2009; Tavoni
and Levin 2014; Carattini et al. 2015). A notable example of voluntary provision
of climate change mitigation is represented by the market for voluntary carbon
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osets. This market has grown exponentially in the last decade: in their analysis, Conte and Kotchen (2011) reported the existence of 97 oset providers and
280 oset projects. According to the same source, we now count 142 registered
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providers for an overall number of 579 projects worldwide .
From a theoretical perspective, individuals may voluntarily contribute to
a public good because they derive some utility from the public good being
provided (pure altruism) or from their own contribution, due for instance to

warm glow

(Andreoni 1990) or positive self-image (Nyborg et al. 2006).

A

further and very contextual explanation relies on the idea of compensating other
activities that reduce the overall level of the same public good (Kotchen 2009).
Hence, instead of restraining one's carbon footprint, one may pay someone else
to reduce emissions and achieve the same eect on atmospheric concentrations
(Conte and Kotchen 2010, p. 93). Assuming that one cares about one's own
carbon footprint, from a standard economic perspective it is ecient to purchase
carbon osets as long as their cost is lower than one's own marginal abatement
cost.
Carbon osets are purchased by individuals, companies and organizations
concerned with their environmental footprint or the image that such footprint
conveys. Academic activities such as travel to conferences are receveing increasing attention due to their sizeable carbon footprint (Spinellis and Louridas 2013;
Desiere 2016), and many academic institutions have started using carbon osets.
In 2015, the conferences of both the European Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists (EAERE, held in Helsinki, June 24-27 2015) and the European Society for Ecological Economics (ESEE, held in Leeds, June 30-July 3
2015) oered registering participants the possibility to purchase carbon osets
to compensate for the emissions associated with their participation. We exploit
this opportunity to provide novel evidence on the economics of carbon osets.
A growing literature, including the one pertaining to the demand for climate
change mitigation, has focused on the main determinants of the demand for osets, generally relying on stated preferences (see Nemet and Johnson 2010 for a
review). We rely both on ocial conference data about observed osetting behavior and on a survey which we asked participants of both conferences to take..
The survey request was sent after the oset decision was made by participants,
and it provides useful complementary information that allows us to assess the
rationale behind the osetting decision. This strategy is used to decrease the
likelihood of dishonest (socially desirable) answers. It also allows us to compare
the answers in our sample to the general behavior of the conference participants.
The behavior of experts, as observed in the eld, may dier dramatically
from the behavior of lay people (Harrison and List 2004). Previous research has
shown that environmental economists' decision to oset does not depend on the
default option given in the registration process, whereas the default option is
generally found to have a positive uptake eect on lay people (Löfgren et al.
2012).

The refutation of this stylized fact among experts suggests that they

tend to have a set opinion on carbon osets. Furthermore, the general public

1 Source:

http://www.carboncatalog.org/. Visited October 23, 2015.
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has expressed skepticism due to both ethical and practical concerns about the
use of carbon osets (cf.

Conte and Kotchen 2010).

We thus shed light on

whether these objections are also shared by experts.
We nd that having the conference expenses and osets covered by the institutions clearly increases the likelihood of oset adoption. However, funding is a
partial explanation. Even in this specic case of potential moral hazard, we nd
that a suciently high level of satisfaction with the proposed osetting program
is necessary to induce economists with practical reservations to participate in
osetting activities. We also nd that some individual-specic characteristics
have a surprising impact on the likelihood to oset. Based on these results, we
derive several implications for both practitioners and policy-makers.
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Methodology

In 2015 EAERE allowed those that registered to the annual conference to purchase a 10 euros oset certicate to compensate European ights and a 40 euros
oset for intercontinental ights.
cation in the Baltic Sea.

The revenue was used to prevent eutrophi-

At the same time, ESEE oered the possibility to
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withdraw one ton of CO2 from the European Union Emission Trading System .
With the support of the local organizers we contacted all participants from the
two conferences and invited them to participate in the same anonymous online
questionnaire.
We obtained data on the oset decision and a series of participant's personal
and academic characteristics. The main descriptive statistics are displayed in
Table A.1 and A.2. We collected 176 (66) observations for the ESEE (EAERE)
conference, for a total of 242 responses. Based on ESEE data, we know that
495 researchers registered at the conference, of which 195 students. The implied
response rate is of about 35%, higher than in most online surveys. There are
about 45% of students in our sample, approximately the same as the observed
rate. Participation to the oset program is around 46% in our ESEE sample,
quite close to the actual participation (around 50% according to the organizers).
The response rate for EAERE is instead about 10%, and participation to the
oset program is around 37% (the ocial participation rate isapproximately
20%). Based on these statistics, we can arguably provide better external validity
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for the ESEE conference, relative to the one organized by EAERE .
We also have information on whether the institution covers the conference-
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related expenses, and the osets for those that purchased them . This is the

2 The details of the osets programs were also provided to conference participants through
the conference websites and booklets. While they dier in their characteristics, both options
correspond to the denition of carbon osets. We discuss below the implications of the two
dierent programs for our analysis.
3 In all estimations we introduce a dummy variable controlling for the conference that
the respondent attended. In this way we are able to capture the dierence between the two
samples. Given the relatively low number of observations available for the EAERE conference,
we take a conservative stance and refrain from providing estimations for small subsamples.
4 Since the two variables are 74% correlated, and the latter would always predict success
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case for the vast majority of respondents (73%). This is an unexplored situation for the young literature on carbon osets and comes with potentially large
implications not only for academics but possibly also for business travelers at
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large . Since most individuals in our sample have the possibility to fully pass
over the costs of osets, it is particularly interesting to understand why some
of them refrain from osetting.
We also know how the participants reached the conference and whether they
had any reservations concerning the use of osets.

That is, participants are

requested to express any concerns they may have concerning osetting in general, regardless of the option proposed by the respective conference. About 20%
(15%) of the sample expressed ethical (practical) reservations. Those who did
were prompted to answer an additional open question, to elicit their perplexities
(see the most emblematic answers in Table A.1). Most comments concerning
practical issues cast doubts on the eective abatements realized by osetting
programs in general, raising issues of additionality and credibility, in particular for aorestation projects and absent any tight oversight (see Schneider and
Kollmuss 2015). This may create an additional dierence between economists
and lay people, the latter being especially favorable to forest osets (Blasch and
Farsi 2014). Part of the ethical critique challenges the monetarization of pollution, while the remaining part challenges the practice of keeping emitting while
(sometimes) osetting, calling into question the moral implication of encouraging osets and justifying carbon-intensive lifestyles (see Anderson 2012 for a
detailed critique). Finally, respondents are asked to rate the specic osetting
program chosen by the conference organizers.

3

Results

Estimates are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
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Given the binary nature of this

decision, we use Probit regressions . In Table 1 we test our main specications.
We bundle all participants having reached the conference by plane and compare
them with relatively cleaner transport modes. We also control for whether the
conference expenses are covered by the participant's institution and introduce a
dummy for the conference to which the data refer. This dummy could measure
either the dierence in the audience or in the oset programs (we control to a
large extent for location by transport modes). The two osetting programs are
indeed relatively dierent in their typology, each conference organizer possibly

in the econometric model, we only introduce the former in the analysis.
5 The civil aviation industry is said to be responsible for about 2% of global and about 10%
of transport greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2014). A non-negligible part of these emissions
is due to business travelers, who are known to be particularly inelastic to price variation
(Borenstein and Rose 2007; Puller and Taylor 2012).
6 The EAERE conference distinguishes osetting between continental and intercontinental
ights. The latter was chosen by 2% of the conference participants. Given the number of
observations at our disposal, we keep osetting as a binary outcome. Our results would not
change if controlling for ying an intercontinental ight. The empirical results are qualitatively
and in most cases quantitatively unchanged if a Logit specication or marginal eects at mean
are used instead of average marginal eects. All variables are in levels.
4

facing a dierent set of preferences for osetting projects (see below). Hence, to
disentangle the two eects and capture dierences in audience, we include the
total number of EAERE and ESEE conferences attended by all participants,
regardless of their current choice. This strategy allows us to capture dierences
in the identication of researchers to either or both societies, taking also into
account potential dierences in preferences for attending conferences. In turn,
dierences in belonging may be also driven by dierent backgrounds, for which
we are however unable to control. The environment around ecological economics
is indeed known to be particularly multidisciplinary, whereas environmental
economists are usually trained as economists.

We hence use the term green

economists to denote social scientists dealing with environmental matters in
close relation to ecological or environmental economics, knowing that they may
not all dene themselves as economists. We provide further analysis below trying
to identify dierent perspectives among those we dene green economists, in
particular with respect to the appropriate approach to growth to be taken while
dealing with climate change. We also include information on the academic rank
of the interviewee, to proxy for income dierences. Since salary may also depend
on the level of seniority and the country of aliation, column (2) controls for
the country of aliation for a number of countries for which we have multiple
observations. With these variables we also expect to capture dierences in the
budget of the institution, which could aect the decision to save on conference
expenses. In column (3) we introduce attitudes towards osets.
First of all, we observe that the ability to pass over the full cost of the conference to the employer is associated to a higher probability to oset. While the
positive and relatively large coecient suggests that it is easier for economists
to be green with their institution's money, the implied probability is still far
from one. Hence, other reasons have to be explored to explain why economists
may not oset even when this is likey to come at no private cost.

Surpris-

ingly, the probability of osetting decreases almost linearly as we move from
students to full professors. One explanation might be that tenured participants
are less likely to do their booking themselves and incentives may then be better
aligned with their departments'. An alternative explanation is that established
academics - especially in economics - may be particularly cynical, for either
selection or training reasons (see Fourcade et al. 2015). The negative and signicant coecient for some countries such as Spain and Germany relative to
the rest of the world suggests that there are dierences in income as well as in
the tightness of the budget constraint, even when controlling for whether the
institution covers the expenses. Even if osets could be passed over, overspending at one conference may have implications for the opportunity to attend other
events, or use departemental funds for other research purposes. Given the positive sign of the age variable, most of the eect it captures is probably related
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to dierences in seniority rather than dierent generational perspectives .
The estimates from column (3) indicate a positive and signicant eect re-

7 We use six of the seven U.S. Census age categories (see Table A.1 for more details). The
coecient for age remains positive and signicant if using mid-points for each category.
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0.130*
0.139

Institution covering expenses

ESEE survey

-0.118

Full professor

(0.259)

(0.320)

(2)

-0.091

0.064

0.067

0.072

0.239

0.300

0.621***

0.133**

-0.067

0.032

0.019

0.168*

0.163**

0.101

Marginal eects

0.028

0.114
-118.96

0.072
-124.47

-114.24

0.49

0.279***

(3)
S.E.

(0.096)

(0.187)

(0.096)

(0.103)

(0.148)

(0.090)

(0.076)

(0.126)

(0.144)

(0.238)

(0.291)

(0.283)

(0.287)

(0.255)

(0.209)

(0.062)

(0.052)

(0.067)

(0.024)

(0.022)

(0.098)

(0.070)

(0.088)

N
201
201
201
Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.
Some participants declare to have already oset through alternative programs.
With our set of controls this variable predicts failure perfectly and is thus not included among the covariates. Clerk is the reference category for the academic position.
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Pseudo R
Log pseudolikelihood

Doubts on the eective realization

0.089
-0.151

0.011

0.088

-0.224**

-0.218***

-0.134*

-0.031

-0.142

-0.008

0.008

0.007

0.171

0.255

0.610**

0.134**

-0.060

0.027

0.022

0.151

0.166**

0.103

Marginal eects

Pricing the unpriceable

(0.109)

(0.151)

(0.099)

(0.076)

(0.131)

(0.145)

(0.269)

(0.312)

(0.299)

(0.304)

(0.251)

(0.198)

(0.048)

(0.052)

(0.068)

(0.024)

(0.022)

(0.099)

(0.073)

(0.093)

S.E.

Contrasting behavioral changes

Opinion on osets

UK

Spain

0.035

-0.219**

Germany

Switzerland

-0.149
-0.229***

Belgium

-0.046

0.072

Associate professor

(0.303)

(0.301)

(0.263)

(0.229)

(0.072)

(0.054)

(0.069)

(0.025)

(0.023)

(0.104)

(0.076)

(0.077)

S.E.

Austria

0.010
0.040

Assistant professor

0.183

Postdoctoral researcher

Senior researcher

0.235

0.603***

Student

PhD student

-0.051
0.124**

Age

EAERE conferences attended

Female

0.014
0.029

ESEE conferences attended

Characteristics of the participant

0.061

Reaching the conference by plane

Marginal eects

(1)

Table 1: Decision to oset - Main estimates from Probit
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(0.017)

(0.017)

N
167
Average marginal eects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01.

-83.00

147

-71.34

Yes
0.282

0.259

Pseudo R2
Log pseudolikelihood

Yes

Yes
Yes

Opinion on osets

(0.097)

0.159*

0.066***

0.062***

-0.009
(0.122)

0.113
(0.104)

0.087
(0.082)

0.087
(0.076)

0.015
(0.102)

0.041
(0.097)

Characteristics of the participant

Degrowth as appropriate approach to climate change

Satisfaction with green osets

ESEE

Institution covering expenses

Reaching the conference by plane

(2)
Marginal eects (S.E.)

(1)
Marginal eects (S.E.)

Table 2: Decision to oset - Additional estimates from Probit (restricted sample)

lated to expressing concerns on the practical implementation of osets. Hence,
expressing pragmatic concerns over osetting in general does not necessarily
imply not purchasing the osets proposed by the conference organizers. This
fact is of particular interest. Our interpretation is that ecological and environmental economists are indeed experienced consumers as suggested by Löfgren
et al. (2012), and not only are unaected by the default choices but are also
particularly attentive to the properties of the osetting program that they are
asked to purchase. Despite the general practical concerns that these economists
express, part of them were convinced by the organizers' proposal and trusted
their osetting choice.

We believe that this result comes with particular im-

plications. As for any good (and policy), its design and characteristics matter
for attentive consumers. Conference participants may be requested to trade-o
the warm glow or self-image benet from osetting with guilt from charging
institutes a higher bill. This result also suggests that conference organizers did
a relatively good job in addressing the potential critiques from their attendees,
critiques which could dier between conferences (see below), and proposed an
osetting option that could convince at least those having practical concerns
over osetting in general terms.
This nding is supported by the results of Table 2, where we restrict attention
to the 183 respondents who rated the proposed oset program. Controlling for
the same covariates as in column (3) of Table 1, our estimates from column (1)
point to a positive and signicant eect of appreciating the specic program.
The coecient implies that any marginal improvement on the 7-point scale
comes with a 6% higher likelihood of osetting. Note that the distribution of
concerns about the osetting program is dierent between conferences, with
ethical implications being primarily a concern for ecological economists. That
is, while we do not nd a signicant dierence in the frequency of osetting
between the two populations, the reasons for osetting may substantially dier.
To further dierentiate between the attendees at the two conferences we control
in column (2) for what respondents consider the most appropriate approach to
growth while tackling climate change. 75% (20%) of the EAERE (ESEE) sample
support green growth whereas 11% (68%) declare to be rather favorable to
degrowth, pointing to persistent dierences in the characteristics of economists
attending one or the other conference, in spite of the convergence in the main
research outlets (cf. Plumecocq 2014). We observe that the coecient for the
ESEE conference becomes practically zero, suggesting that this decoupling in
preferences for (de)growth probably contributes to dierentiate between real
ecological and environmental economists. Compared to green growth, being in
favor of degrowth is associated to a higher propensity to oset.
The empirical analysis of osetting decisions we have performed here allows
us to study the behavior of experts and derive some lessons for both practitioners and policy-makers.

First, we nd that the ability of passing over the

conference costs to one's employer increases the likelihood of participating in
the oset market. While this nding may seem obvious, it has important implications.

Emissions from traveling, in particular from aviation, represent a

non-negligible portion of global greenhouse gases and their regulation under the
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umbrella of an international agreement is still part of a erce debate. Managing to make osetting the norm when traveling for business would provide a
large push forward for voluntary carbon markets, implying also higher prices
and stronger signals for all actors in the market. Second, we provide empirical
evidence that practical concerns with the mechanics of osets may coexist with
their uptake. This somewhat unexpected result has far-reaching implications.
Skepticism based on practical issues is founded on recent negative experience
with carbon markets, and is likely to be persistent. Whether such experiences
will hinder the development of voluntary osets and carbon markets is an open
question.

Our preliminary answer, based on experts' behavior, is that such

skepticism should be an additional motivation for osets program managers to
oer sound projects that reassure potential buyers. Our evidence suggests that
both academic societies were quite successful in this task.

Project providers

should learn from this experience. The same applies to policy-makers, who now
face the hard task of rebuilding condence in integrated carbon markets and
deliver internationally transferable mitigation outcomes (article 6 of the Paris
Agreement). Failing to do so could imply very high mitigation costs, and could
possibly jeopardize the current pledges and the ambition of more stringent post2020 targets (Baranzini et al. 2015). Whether the opinion of the public is as
reactive to the properties of dierent osetting designs is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, our results suggest that the experts' ability to distinguish
sound osetting projects from unrealiable ones could and probably should be
put at the service of society, to both orient policy decisions and increase condence in sound osetting. In this sense, further research on the reservations of
the general public, and how these may be aected by expert opinion, would be
useful to shed light on the potential for the profession to increase the market
for voluntary carbon osets in size and quality, as well as to contribute to the
acceptability of future international carbon markets.
Finally, this study provides new information about conference participants in
ecological and environmental economics, with useful implications for all economists
active in the eld. While one may argue that the separating line between environmental and ecological economics is increasingly blurred (Plumecocq (2014)),
such dierence persists among those that attend the respective conferences, perhaps due to a greater proclivity for interdisciplinary work in economics in recent
years (Tavoni and Levin (2014)). Hence, looking only at convergence in journals,
one may miss part of the story of the evolution of ecological and environmental
economics as schools of thought organized in dierent and possibly competing
societies. Based on our results, we speculate that to appreciate the dierences
that set the two apart, one should attend both conferences, since the conceptual
dierences between ecological and environmental economics are more nuanced
in the publications of the respective agship journals.
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4

Conclusions

In the last decade the market for osets has grown rapidly, but still remains
a niche market.

Most professional activities are still not oset, even though

in many situations businessmen could seemingly pass over the cost of osets
to their employer. We investigate this issue by analyzing the behavior of ecological and environmental economists who are likely to be familiar with such
instrument. We nd that having the option to pass over the cost is associated
with a larger likelihood of osetting. However, economists can be refractory to
purchase osets for a number of reasons, which may also dier between ecological and environmental economists.

Ethical concerns mainly challenge the

pollute and oset paradigm, which tends to lend legitimacy to more business
as usual and possibly delay the required regime shift towards a society living
within planetary boundaries. Practical concerns are related with the eective
realization of osets, including issues of additionality and credibility.
We believe that all these concerns expressed by experts should be given an
appropriate space in the societal debate and should be taken into account by
policymakers, who in the next years are likely to increasingly rely on carbon
credits to meet their pledges. Likewise, project providers have much to learn
from an open dialogue with the end-users, with a view to facilitating future
growth in this market. While the profession has expressed many concerns towards carbon osets, our results show that both ecological and environmental
economists are willing to participate in the voluntary carbon markets, provided
that oset projects meet certain criteria. Scaling up voluntary carbon markets
and the public purchase of foreign osets may thus benet from the profession's endorsement, which of course needs to be earned with proper design and
transparent proposals.
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Appendix
A.1

Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics: socio-economic and professional characteristics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Socio-economic characteristics
Gender (female)

0.495

0.501

0

1

220

Age (15-24; ... ; 55-64; >65)

3.627

0.987

2

7

220

Professional characteristics
BA/MA student

0.033

0.179

0

1

212

PhD student

0.405

0.492

0

1

222

Post-doctoral researcher

0.194

0.396

0

1

222

Senior researcher

0.077

0.267

0

1

222

Assistant professor

0.068

0.252

0

1

222
222

Associate professor

0.068

0.252

0

1

Full professor

0.072

0.259

0

1

222

Clerk

0.131

0.338

0

1

222
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Table A.2: Summary statistics: Transport modes, oset decisions and preferences
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Oset
Decision to oset
Institution covers all costs
Institution covers in part

0.409

0.493

0

1

225

0.73

0.445

0

1

230

0.14

0.348

0

1

242

Ethical reservations

0.202

0.403

0

1

242

Practical reservations

0.153

0.361

0

1

242

Transport modes (multiple transport modes possible)
Walking, cycling

0.025

0.156

0

1

242

Car

0.074

0.263

0

1

242
237

Km driven by car
Coach
Km driven by coach
Train
Km driven by train

7.3

60.43

0

700

0.07

0.256

0

1

242

22.242

124.973

0

1300

240

0.409

0.493

0

1

242

209.885

460.402

0

2600

226

Flight within the country

0.025

0.156

0

1

242

Flight within Europe

0.587

0.493

0

1

242

0.07

0.256

0

1

242
242

Flight from outside Europe

Environmental and academic preferences
Participation at EAERE conferences

0.913

1.723

0

9

Participation at ESEE conferences

1.492

1.813

0

9

242

Business as usual

0.023

0.149

0

1

220

Green growth

0.355

0.479

0

1

220

Degrowth

0.523

0.501

0

1

220

Satisfaction with oset options

5.044

1.827

0

7

183

Satisfaction with vegeterian options

5.097

1.84

0

7

155

Satisfaction with packaging

4.409

1.867

1

7

149

4.23

1.91

1

7

148

Satisfaction with recycling options

14

15

ESEE
ESEE
ESEE
ESEE

My skepticism was fully conrmed by the latest Nature article on misuse of JI in Russia/Ukraine.

Similarly, I have experienced rsthand practical problems with forestation problems in the tropics

ESEE

Simply planting trees won't help, they also need to be cared for

The eectiveness of these projects in actually decreasing emissions at the source has been questioned by several scholars

ESEE

I'm never quite sure where the money really goes

Want to make sure that osets are high quality, solid MRV, gold standard, retirement of EUETS or the likes

ESEE

Lack of proof that it is working. Not enough transparency on how this money is invested

 [...] Once CO2 from fossil sources is released, any way to store it will not be as long-lasting

EAERE

 [...] Ideologically, I am not in favour of market-based instruments for conservation

Doubts on the eective realization of carbon osets

ESEE
ESEE

I don't believe in putting a price on carbon emissions. I would rather lower my emissions as low as possible

Pricing the unpriceable

To induce moral licencing and to foster poor environmental behaviors with the reason that you oset it 

ESEE

Given the urgency of climate issue, CO2 osets are illusive.

Osets only work if we're already at low enough emission levels (i.e. consume and produce within planetary boundaries)

ESEE
ESEE

In the long run, a change of habit is necessary for which those osets might actually become an obstacle

so they "buy indulgences" instead

but see themselves as too important to make the necessary and signicant adjustments to their own live;

ESEE
ESEE

In the end are an excuse for inaction amongst high emitters who acknowledge the climate change problem

EAERE

I think it is just a patch, we would need to modify much more our lifestyles/society/culture

EAERE

I am not convinced that CO2 osets actually work but rather think that I am buying a relief for my bad conscience

Conference

Could make people y more if they think osetting solves all environmental harm from ying

Contrasting behavioral changes necessary to deal with climate change

Reservations

Table A.3: Emblematic examples of reservations related to osets
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